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1INTRODUCTION
When making foreign direct investments, one of the primary concerns of the investor is how the
government in the host country will regulate the investment.  If the government is credible, it can
announce the regulatory regime for the investment.  The investor will then trust the government
and decide whether the investment is profitable within the announced regime.  If the government
is not credible, the investor will not believe in the government’s announced policy.  He will now
evaluate the possibility of changes in the announced regime when he makes his investment
decision.  The question of credibility is important to the investor because it partially determines
the value of the investment and therefore also influences the investor’s decision of whether to
invest.  Whether the lack of credibility is important to the country depends on whether the
government wants the foreign investor to make the investment.  If, e.g., the government is able to
make the investment by itself through a state owned company, the credibility issue related to
regulation of a specific investment may be of less interest.  In most cases, however, it is
reasonable to believe that even countries with a large state-owned sector to some degree are
dependent on foreign private investments and therefore are concerned with the question of
credibility.
A generic game with investment and regulation is in a form where the investor makes an effort
(investment) at a point in time, and the government decides how much reward (return on the
investment) the investor will receive at a later point in time.  In these models it is a necessary
2condition for the investments to take place that the investor receives, or believes that he will
receive, a sufficiently large reward later.  The seminal article by Kydland and Prescott [7]
addressed the inherent problem in selecting optimal policies in a multi-period setting1.  If the
investor has rational expectations, he will see that it may be optimal for the government to
change the pre-announced regulation at a later point in time.  This will influence the investor’s
decision making.  The result may be that the investment is not made, even though both the
investor and the government in principle could have benefited from the investment.  As noted by
Fischer [4], if some form of cooperation between the regulator and the regulated could be
achieved, both parties could be made better off as compared to the situation with no cooperative
behavior.
The aim of our work is to present a model where the cooperation between the investor and the
government is modeled explicitly as the outcome of a bargaining process between the investor
and the government.  We assume from the outset that the investor knows for certain that the
government is not credible.  We also assume that the investment series finite, and that the
information is complete and perfect.  This means that the investor’s and the government’s reward
functions, the structure of the game, and all previous moves are known by the players.  The
presented model is an alternative to existing models that may be used for analyzing the
interaction between an investor and a regulator when credibility is an issue.  We now look at
competing alternative models that may be used when analyzing the investment-taxation game.
The profit from the investment leading to extraction and subsequent sale of natural resources
may be viewed as a “pie” which the government and the investor may share.  If the investment
3series is infinite and if the government and the investor have perfect information regarding
previous play and each other’s utility functions, we may apply the Folk Theorem to model how
the profit from the investments will be shared.  In short, see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole [5] pages
150-160, the Folk Theorem suggests that any sharing of the “pie” may be obtained if the players
have discount factors close to one.  The result is based on an equilibrium strategy involving
punishment.  If one of the players deviates from the optimal strategy, this will trigger a
punishment of the deviating player by the others players for the remaining part of the game.
When the investment series is finite, when the final date of the game is sufficiently large, and
maintaining the assumption of perfect information, it may still be possible to model the parties’
equilibrium strategies such that investment may occur.  As in Benoit and Krishna [1] and [2], this
must involve a “reward cycle” at the end of the game where both the players receive a
sufficiently high payoff.  This future reward will discipline the players such that the players’
equilibrium strategy resembles “cooperative behavior”.  This equilibrium relies on the
punishment of the deviating player as in the Folk Theorem.
Of course, if the government could commit itself to the pre-announced regime, it could select a
regime such that the investor would decide to invest.  This assumes that the government would
have to behave sub-optimal at future dates.  One reason why the government would behave sub-
optimal is because it is concerned with its reputation.  In order to discuss reputation, it is
necessary to introduce different generic types of a player and also imperfect information
regarding the true type of the player.  This was the idea of Kreps and Wilson [6].  In these
models investment may occur even if there is only a small probability that the government will
stick to its pre-announced regime.  Examples of articles analyzing credibility in finite games with
4imperfect information are, e.g., Cherian and Perotti [3], Rodrik [10] and [11].  In the simplest
form the government may be one which will tax all the profit at a suitable date, or one which will
not.  The investor assigns at the initial date a probability that the government is of a “tax
everything”-type, and decides whether to invest.  The investor then updates this probability
based on observing the government’s actions and uses the updated probability when determining
the optimal play.
Our model offers the advantages that it may help to explain the interaction between the investor
and the regulator when we consider the players’ information to be complete and perfect, and
when the investment series is finite.  While Benoit and Krishnan model the cooperative behavior
as resulting from an equilibrium strategy in a non-cooperative game, we rely on the assumption
that the parties are able to cooperate by entering into short-lived agreements if it is to their
advantage, i.e., agreements that are valid within a period only.  Whether this is a reasonable
assumption, will of course depend on the problem being analyzed.  First of all, it seems
reasonable to assume, due to practical considerations, that the number of investors participating
in the bargaining should be restricted.  There is only one investor in the model we suggest.  This
investor may be thought of as a single large investor, or as the representative of several large
investors in the economy.  The second question to consider when judging whether the model is
reasonable, is the type of regulation the investor and the government may bargain over.  An
investment may, in principle, be influenced by three types of regulatory regimes: General
regulations applying to all companies in the economy, industry specific regulation applying to
companies in an industry like, e.g., the oil and gas industry, and investment specific regulation
applying to the specific investment being made.  For the latter case, the investment should be
5especially large and important to the government.  Examples of such investments may be the
development and extraction of large natural resources.  In order to interpret the model with
respect to industry specific regulation, it is necessary to assume that the modeled investor is a
representative of all the investors in the industry.  For investment in, and taxation of, natural
resources, especially oil and natural gas, we claim that the presented model may, in some
instances, help in understanding the interaction between the investors and the government.  At
least from an outside observer’s point of view, it seems that the big oil companies frequently
approach the government in the country where they invest in order to achieve lower taxes or
more lenient terms for their operations.  This seems especially to be true when new large
investments are considered.  We also observe that regulations relating to the oil and gas industry
are frequently changed.
We represent regulation by a royalty, i.e., a sales tax.  The royalty is meant to represent any
transferal of value between the investor and the government.  A negative royalty means that the
government pays a subsidy to the investor.  This subsidy may be paid in units of money, or, e.g.,
by a change in environmental regulations leading to a less expensive investment expenditure or
as a discount to the investor for the purchase of a share in a state owned-company being
privatized.  At the beginning of each period the investor and the government bargain over the
royalty that will apply to the previous period’s production and the investment activity the
investor will perform during the current period.  If an agreement is not reached, a non-
cooperative sub game will start.  The country will declare the royalty rate and the investor will
decide whether to continue to invest or abandon the investment series. By introducing bargaining
6within a period we assume that the parties will stick to an agreement within the period.  This
assumes intra-period credibility, which is a less strict assumption than inter-period credibility.
The model does not include any uncertainty regarding the investment opportunity or the revenue
the investment will generate.  In the model, only the investor may make the investment.  If the
investor decides to abandon the investment series, the decision is irreversible.  These
assumptions are simplified and may make the model less realistic for many countries.  However,
these assumptions may be realistic in situations where the government cannot make the
investments through a state-owned company, e.g., due to lack of know-how.  Because there is no
uncertainty related to the commodity price, we do not include decisions such as to close down
production temporarily or to wait.  The investor’s only choice is whether to make the investment
or abandon the investment series.  These assumptions are primarily made to simplify the
presentation and maintaining the focus on the players’ strategies and the effect of bargaining.
For a specific solution to the game, we derive a sufficient condition for when an investment
series will be undertaken.
We start in the next section by presenting the investment opportunity and the game.  We then
study a particular solution.  We present numerical examples before summarizing the main results
in the final section.
7A MODEL WITH INTRA-PERIOD BARGAINING
The investment opportunity
We consider a model with a fixed time horizon, , where  is a specific point in time,
 ,....,2,1,0= .  The investment opportunity consists of a series of one-period investments,
where the payment of an investment cost at time , 
W
 , will lead to proceeds from the investment
at time +1, 1+W .  The proceeds at the first time, 0 , is equal to zero.  The sequence of
investment amounts is ),..,,( 10 7 , and we assume that all but the final investments are strictly
positive and that the final investment amount is equal to zero, i.e., 0>
W
  for 1,....,2,1,0 −= 
and .0=
7

The game
The total game consists of  sub games, where the sub game played at time  is as outlined in
Figure 1. The players are the government of the country, , and the investor, .  A pure strategy
for player  in the sub game at time , ),,(
,,,,
'
WL
$
WL
1
WLWL
	 = , is a complete plan for how to play the
sub game, i.e., the announcement of the acceptable royalty in the negotiations, 1
WL

,
, the action to
8choose in case an agreement is reached, $
WL

,
, and the action to choose if an agreement is not
reached, '
WL

,
. The country and the investor start by negotiating.  They negotiate over the royalty,
W

 , which the country will announce and which will apply to the proceeds from the investment
made at time 1− , and over the investor’s investment expenditure, 
W
 .   An 
 is a
specification of how the parties will act, i.e., the pair ),(
,,
$
W,
$
W&
 .
(insert Figure 1 approximately here)
The negotiated royalty rate at time , 
W

~ , is resulting from the negotiations between the parties.
We let the country’s action in the negotiations, 1
W&

,
, be to declare the lowest royalty the country
is willing to accept in order to enter into an agreement, and the investor’s decision is to declare
the highest royalty he is willing to accept, 1
W,

,
.  We will also use the term 

when we mean the players’ acceptable royalty.  An agreement solution at time  is 	 if
1
W,W
1
W&


,,
~ ≤≤ .  If there is no room for negotiations, the resulting solution will be the empty set
∅.  If an agreement is feasible, we assume that the negotiated royalty rate will be equal to a
weighted average, with weight 10 ≤≤α , of the parties announced acceptable royalty2, i.e.,

 ≤−+=
.otherwise
if)(
~ ,,,,,

1
W,
1
W&
1
W&
1
W,
1
W&
W



α (1)
9In order for (1) to be well defined, we make the assumption that the demanded royalty is
bounded, i.e.,  1
WL
∈
,
,  ,= .  The highest allowed royalty is 
 , the lowest allowed royalty is

 , and 

 ≤≤ .  This is an assumption made for technical reasons to avoid infinite royalty.
If an agreement is not made, the country will announce a royalty, '
W&

,
, and the investor will
determine the investment expenditure, '
W,

,
.  Even though the government may set an
extraordinary high royalty equaling more than hundred per cent of proceeds, the investor does
not have to pay this if he decides to abandon the investment.  We therefore get the following
restrictions on the actual royalty at time .  If the investor continues to invest, he must pay the
royalty declared by the country.  In this case we may have that 
WW

 > , which means that the
investor does not keep anything from proceeds from previous investments, and in addition he
must pay the country an amount equal to )(
WW

 − .  If 0<
W

 , the country subsidizes the
investor.  Note that if the country pays subsidies in case of a disagreement, the investor may take
the subsidies and leave the country.
Based on the parties’ pure strategies for the sub game at time , the resulting royalty and
investment expenditures will be determined such that either an agreement solution or a
disagreement solution is resulting from the played strategies, i.e.,



≠
==
.andfeasiblenotisagreementanif)),,(min(
andfeasiblenotisagreementanif),(
feasibleisagreementanif),(
),(
,,,
,,,
,,
W
'
W,
'
W,W
'
W&
W
'
W,
'
W,
'
W&
$
W,
$
W&
WW




 (2)
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The history of the game at time , W , is a collection of the players’ sub game strategies up to
that time,
 ),,...,( 120 −−= WWW 			 , (3)
where ),(
,, W,W&W
			 =  and the history at time zero is the empty set, ∅.  We assume that the
investor’s decision to abandon the investment is irreversible.  The players’ permissible actions at
time , )( W , are conditioned on whether the investment series have been abandoned
previously, i.e.,

 ∉
=∈
−
.otherwise)}0,0,0(),0,~,0{(
),..,(0if))},0(,,(),,~,{()( 11
W
WWWWW
W 



	
 (4)
We see from (4) that, provided the investment has not been abandoned in the previous play, an
agreement will always involve the payment of the investment amount 
W
 .  We further notice that
intra-period credibility is assumed because 
W
$
W&

 ~
,
=  and 
W
$
W,
 =
,
.  Credibility here means that
the players will follow the agreement.
The parties set of cash flow at time , )( 1+W , is a function of the history of the game at time +1
and the characteristics of the investment opportunity:
11


−−+
∉−−+
==
−+++
.otherwise)}(),{(
),..,(0if)}(),{()}(),({)( 11111
WWWW
WWWWWWW
,
W
&
W






 (5)
Equation (4) ensures that the parties’ cash flow according to equation (5) will be equal to zero if
the investment has been abandoned at a previous point in time.  If the investment has not been
abandoned, the investor’s cash flow equals the proceeds from previous investment less royalty
and the investment expenditure.  The country’s cash flow equals the royalty plus extra revenue
generated from the investor’s investment activity.  This is modeled as a nonnegative constant 
multiplied by the actual investment expenditure.  The constant   may be thought of as a
“multiplier effect” on the economy caused by the investment expenditure.
The parties’ utility over cash flow is measured by a set of utility functions ))(( 1+W .  We
assume that the utility of no cash flow is equal to zero and that players’ utility functions are
increasing, i.e., 0)0( =
L
  and 0’ >
L
  for  ,= .
The utility for the sub games ,..,discounted to time  is a function from the remaining time of
the game and the history at time +1 to the real numbers, i.e., →+1),..,1,0(:(.,.) 7 ΡΡ,
where 1+7  is the set of all possible histories for the game.  More precisely,
,and.s.t,))(()(),( 111111 ++++
=
+−+ ∈∈∀= ∑ 777Y7
WY
Y
L
WY
L
7
L
 δ (6)
where 
L
δ  is a discount factor, 10 ≤≤
L
δ , and where  ,= .
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Equilibrium strategies
Care must be taken when characterizing an equilibrium strategy of the game we have suggested.
The game contains nodes where the players bargain, i.e., they move together, and nodes where
they move independently.  If we want to use bargaining theory to determine the outcome of the
bargaining process, we need to make certain that the negotiation problem is properly defined.
Generally, a negotiation problem consists of the set of possible outcomes, here the range , and
the disagreement allocation that the players will receive if the bargaining fails, here 1
W&

,
 and
1
W,

,
.  In this game the disagreement allocation will be determined by the players subsequent play
if bargaining fails.  From Figure 1 we see that in case of no agreement, the rest of the game
starting with the country declaring the “disagreement royalty” may be considered as a game in
its own right.  By the term 	
				 we mean the sub game where the
country declares the royalty, '
W&

,
, and the investor decides whether to invest, '
W,

,
, as well as the
rest of the game for time  ,..,1+= .  We say that player ’s demand in the bargaining at time
, 1
WL

,
, is a 
	

 if player  is not made worse off by entering into an agreement with
a royalty 1
WL

,
, as compared to the alternative of not entering into an agreement.  In order to make
this precise, we first introduce the concept of a pure strategy for player  of the game starting at
time  and ending at time , i.e., for the rest of the game.  This strategy, W
L
 | , is conditioned on
the history of the game at time .  The players’ utility discounted to time  for the remaining part
13
of the game starting at time , is a function of the players’ pure strategies for the remaining part
of the game.  We define
.,,)|,|(.s.t),()|,|( 11  7W
,
W
&
7
L
W
,
W
&L
=∈≡ ++ (7)
We first consider a specific strategy combination, )|ˆ,|ˆ( W
,
W
&
 , where an agreement is
entered into at time  and where the negotiated royalty is equal to one of the players’ demanded
royalty, i.e.,
$
WL
$
W&
$
W,
$
W&WW
W
,
W
&

,,,,
ˆand),(),(s.t.)|ˆ,|ˆ( == . (8)
We then consider another strategy combination, )|,|( W
,
W
&
 , which is identical to
)|ˆ,|ˆ( W
,
W
&
  except for player ’s demanded royalty in the negotiations, 1
WL

,
.  This demanded
royalty is such that an agreement will not be entered into at time .  We say that 1
WL

,
ˆ
 in (8) is a
credible demand for player  in the negotiations at time  if the following equation holds:
)|,|()|ˆ,|ˆ( W
,
W
&L
W
,
W
&L
 = . (9)
The set of strategies for player  such that the demands in the negotiations are credible for all  is
0|  &UHG
L
.  We may now define a Nash equilibrium of the whole game with credible demands in
the negotiations in the traditional way as the strategy pair )|,|( 0*0* 
,&
 characterized by
14
000*00*0* ||allfor)|,|()|,|(  &UHG
&&,&&,&&
∈≥ , (10)
and
0000*0*0* ||allfor)|,|()|,|(  &UHG
,,,&,,&,
∈≥ .
THE GAME SOLVED WITH BACKWARD INDUCTION AND WITH CREDIBLE
DEMANDS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
We assume that the restriction of the players’ demanded royalty in the negotiations to the set  is
not binding, i.e.,  1
WL
∈*
,
 for all ,  ,= .
	
	   		
			

							
	 0)|,|( ** ≥W
,
W
&L
 ,  ,....,0= ,  ,= .
Proof:  The proof is shown in the appendix. 
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It is appropriate to make the following observation based on Proposition 1.  If the model with
intra-period bargaining is compared to another model where the country is credible and able to
dictate the royalty, then the investor will not be worse off at time zero in the model with intra-
period bargaining.  This because in the latter model it will be optimal for the county to announce
a royalty that leaves the investor with zero utility at the initial date, but where he will undertake
the investment series.
	
  							

		
	
		
			
						
W
'
W,
  =*
,
				
				
	 1
W,
1
W&W
 *
,
*
,
~
== 
Proof:  The proof is shown in the appendix. 
The implication of Lemma 1 is that if the players in the case of a disagreement at time  achieve
further investment, then they will not be worse off making an agreement where the agreed
royalty is equal to the royalty the country otherwise would have declared.
	 	!								

			
					

					
WW
  ≠ 		
					
				
Proof:  The proof is shown in the appendix. 
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According to Lemma 1 and 2, the investor will abandon the investment series the first time the
country and the investor are not able to cooperate.  The country will then prefer the alternative of
full taxation of proceeds from the previous investment and the subsequent departure by the
investor to the alternative of an agreement involving further production.
We now turn to the question of deriving a sufficient condition for when the whole investment
series will be undertaken in the game.  We say that 		
			
 	
"
							if
)()()( 1 W&W&&WWW&    ≥++− +δ . (11)
The right hand side of (11) is the country’s utility from full taxation of the revenue at time .  The
left hand side is the country’s time  utility from further production and full taxation of the
revenue at the next point in time.  We may interpret inequality (11) in the following way: The
country is willing to finance the investment expenditure 
W
  with the proceeds 
W
 .  With this
interpretation, the investment expenditure is fully financed by the proceeds if 
WW
  ≥ .  If
WW
  < , the country would have to obtain additional financing.
		    			
	
 		"
							
	 1,....,0 −=  								
 					
			"
	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Proof:  The proof is found in the appendix. 
Example
We consider an example with two investment amounts, i.e., the game covers two periods and
three points in time.  The gross return on the investment, , is assumed constant, i.e.,
)1(1   WW += −  for 2,1= , where 3.0= .  The parties’ utility functions are linear.  The
country’s utility function is 
WWWW&
 05.0)( +=+ .  The investor’s utility function is
WWWWWW,
 −−=−− )( .  The country’s and the investor’s discount factors are 0.95 and 0.9,
respectively.  We further assume that 5.0=α , see equation (1).  The initial investment, 0 , is
10.  For three different investment amounts at time one we study how the game will be played
when solved with backward induction and with credible demands in the negotiations.  See Table
1 for a summary of the variables and the players’ equilibrium strategies.  In all three cases, the
country receives the whole revenue at the final time.
For the case when 1  is equal to 78, the investor’s optimal decision at time one if an agreement is
not entered into is not to make the final investment, i.e., 0* 1, =
'
,
 .  In order to enter into an
agreement, the agreed royalty should at least leave the investor with an after royalty income
equal to the investment amount, i.e., 657813* 1, −=−=1, .  In case of a disagreement, the country
18
will tax everything from the first investment, i.e., 13* 1, =
'
&
 .  In order for the country to enter into
an agreement, it should not be worse off compared to the full taxation of the first revenue, i.e.,
134.10195.07805.0*
,
=⋅+⋅+1
W&
 .
Solving this equation, we get that 2.87* 1, −=
1
&
 .  Because 1
,
1
&
 * 1,
*
1, ≤ , an agreement is feasible.
The negotiated royalty rate is equal to –76.1.  The parties’ utilities discounted to time one are
24.1 and 11.1 for the country and the investor, respectively.  At time zero, the investor’s utility
from investing will be equal to zero, i.e., 01.119.013 =⋅+− .  The investor will therefore be
willing to make the investment.
(insert Table 1 approximately here)
Concentrating on time zero, we see that if 1  is equal to 70, the investor would not be willing to
undertake the first investment unless an agreement is entered into.  The country is willing to pay
a subsidy of 22.3 in order to make the investor invest while the investor only would require a
subsidy of 1.  The negotiated royalty is –11.7.  The result is that the investor invests, and his
utility at time zero is 10.7.  When 1  is equal to 90, the investor would be willing to pay a royalty
at time zero of 1.5 in order to undertake the investment.  In case of a disagreement at time zero,
the country would then declare a royalty equal to 1.5 and the investor would invest.  In this case
an agreement will be entered into, and the agreed royalty is equal to 1.5.
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SUMMARY
We have presented a investment and taxation game between an investor and a government,
where:
1. The information is complete and perfect.
2. The time horizon is finite.
3. The government cannot commit itself to a tax regime for future periods, but both the
investor and the government are able to make short-lived agreements covering the current
periods.
4. The bargaining over the tax that will apply to the current period’s revenue and the
continued investment activity of the investor, is explicitly included in the game.
For a specific solution to this game we have shown sufficient conditions for when an investment
series will be undertaken.  We have also shown that the parties’ utility from playing the game,
when this specific solution is applied, is nonnegative. When modeling investment and taxation
games, the presented model is an alternative to existing models, many of whom rely on an
infinite time horizon or on incomplete or imperfect information.
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Time 1 ),(,),( *,*,* ,* , 'W,1W,'W&1W&  W W W ),( 3*& ),( 3* ,
2= 78 (101.4,101.4),(101.4,0.0) 101.4 101.4 0.0 101.4 0.0
70 (91.0,91.0),(91.0,0.0) 91.0 91.0 0.0 91.0 0.0
90 (117.0,117.0),(117.0,0.0) 117.0 117.0 0.0 117.0 0.0
1= 78 (-87.2,13.0),(-65.0,0.0) 13.0 -76.1 78.0 24.1 11.1
70 (-77.0,13.0),(-57.0,0.0) 13.0 -67.0 70.0 23.0 10.0
90 (-102.7,13,0),(-77,0,0.0) 13.0 -89.8 90.0 25.8 12.8
0= 78 (0.0,0.0),(0.0,10.0) 0.0 0.0 10.0 23.4 0.0
70 (-22.3,0.0),(-1.0,0.0) 0.0 -11.7 10.0 10.7 10.7
90 (1.5,1.5),(1.5,10.0) 0.0 1.5 10.0 26.5 0.0
Table 1 Summary of the game with intra-period bargaining for different levels of investments at
time 1= , 1 , when 100 =
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1
When the game is solved with backward induction, the players’ optimal strategy for the sub
game at time  will be a part of the optimal strategy for the rest of the game.  The investor has
always the option to abandon the investment series.  Because, by assumption, 0)0( =
,
	 , any
optimal strategy for the investor cannot leave him with a lower discounted utility than zero.
Similarly, the country can always select a strategy where the proceeds from previous year’s
investment is taxed in full.  Because the proceeds are nonnegative, and by assumption,
0)0( =
&
	 , any optimal strategy for the country cannot leave the country with a lower utility than
zero. 
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the situation for the country at time  in the situation when an agreement is not reached.
The country’s action, '
W&

,
, may then influence the investor’s action of whether to invest.  The
investor will choose to invest if
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,
1
,
++ ++−≥++−− 7
,,W
'
W&W,
7
,,W
'
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		 δδ ,             (A1)
where 
W
'
W,
 =
,
ˆ , 
1
,,
ˆ)ˆ,( +∈ 7'
W,
'
W&
 , 0
,
=
'
W,
 , and 1
,,
),( +∈ 7'
W,
'
W&
 .  The left hand side (LHS) of
(A1) is the investor’s utility if he chooses to invest, and the right hand side (RHS) is his utility if
he chooses to abandon the investment.  Because 0),1( 1 =+ +7
,,
δ  when the investor abandons
the investment, we may rewrite (A1) as
)),min(()ˆ,1()(
,
1
, W
'
W&W,
7
,,W
'
W&W,
		 −≥++−− +δ .       (A2)
Consider first the case when the country cannot select a royalty such that this inequality will
hold.  It will then be optimal for the country to announce 
W
'
W&
 =*
,
 because this maximizes the
country’s utility. The investor will then abandon the investment.
Consider then the case where the country can declare a royalty such that (A2) holds, and
consider the largest royalty rate for which (A2) will hold, '
W&

,
′ .  Because of the assumption of
increasing utility functions, the investor will choose to invest if the announced royalty is not
higher than this level, and to abandon the investment if the royalty is higher. Whether the country
prefers that investment takes place, depends on its utility from the rest of the game.  Consider
another royalty rate announced by the country, '
W&

,
′′ , such that '
W&
'
W&

,,
′>′′ .  The country would
then prefer to announce '
W&

,
′
 if
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 , 0
,
=
'
W,
 , and 1
,,
),( +′′∈′′ 7'
W,
'
W&
 .   The LHS of (A3) is the
country’s utility if the investment is made and the RHS is its utility if the investor abandons the
investment.  The term ),1( 1+′′+ 7
&&
δ will be zero because the investor abandons the
investment series.
We first look at the situation when 
W
'
W&
 ≥′
,
.  We then see that inequality (A3) will always hold
and '
W&
'
W&

,
*
,
′= .  If 
W
'
W&
 <′
,
, the country must compare its utility when investment continues
with its utility if it declares maximum royalty and the investment is abandoned, i.e.,
)()ˆ,1()( 1
, W&
7
&&W
'
W&&
	
	 ≥′+++′ +δ ,               (A4)
where we have used the fact that it would not be optimal for the country to set 
W
'
W&
 <′′
,
 if the
investor will abandon the investment.
If (A4) does not hold, 
W
'
W&
 =*
,
 and the investor will abandon the investment.  If (A4) does hold,
'
W&
'
W&

,
*
,
′=  and the investor will not abandon the investment.
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We have now completely described the players’ optimal actions in the sub game conditioned on
no agreement being reached at time .  The parties’ utility resulting from this sub game will
determine their credible demands, or credible threats, in the negotiations, ),( *
,
*
,
1
W,
1
W&
  (we
simplify the notation by only using the symbol 1* +7  for the equilibrium strategies):
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,
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We see from conditions (A6) and (A5), that if 
W
'
W,
 =*
,
, then 1
W&
'
W&
1
W,
 *
,
*
,
*
,
==  which also will be
equal to 
W
	~  by equation (1). 
Proof of Lemma 2
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If the investment series has not been abandoned previously, we know that 
WW

 =  if 
W
'
W,
 =*
,
 by
Lemma 1.  The only case where 
WW

 ≠  is therefore if 
W
'
W,
 ≠*
,
.  Consider the situation for the
country where 1
W&
*
,
 is defined by the second line in (A5).  We insert the investor’s maximum
acceptable royalty, 1
W,
*
,
, and get that the country would accept this royalty if
)(),1()( 1**
, W&
7
&&W
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W,&
 ≥+++ +δ .       (A7)
If inequality (A7) does not hold, the investor’s acceptable royalty is not higher than the country’s
acceptable royalty.  It will therefore be optimal for the country that an agreement is not entered
into, the country taxes in full the proceeds from the previous year’s investment, and the investor
abandons the investment.  In this case we have that 1
W,
1
W&
 *
,
*
,
>  and an agreement is not feasible.
If however (A7) does hold, the country would prefer that an investment is made.  In this case,
1
W,
1
W&
 *
,
*
,
≤ , and an agreement is feasible. 
Proof of Proposition 2
By Lemma 1 we know that we only need to consider the case when the investor will abandon the
investment in case of an agreement, i.e., when 
W
'
W,
 ≠*
,
.  The condition for when the country
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would be willing to undertake the one-period investment at time  by itself is given by inequality
(11).  We now compare inequality (11) with the second line in (A5).  Because
),1()( 1*1 ++ +≤ 7&&W&&  δδ , we know that 1W&* ,  in equation (A5) is not larger than )( WW  −
in inequality (11), i.e., )(*
, WW
1
W&
 −≤ .  By inserting 1
W&
*
,
 in the investor’s second line of (A6),
we find that the investor will enter into an agreement if
)0(),1()( 1**
, ,
7
,,W
1
W&W,
 ≥′++−− +δ . (A8)
The RHS of (A8) is zero by assumption.  The LHS of (A8) will be nonnegative.  The discounted
future utility, ),1( 1* ++ 7
,,
δ , is nonnegative and )( *
, W
1
W&W,
 −−  is nonnegative because
)(*
, WW
1
W&
 −≤ .  This means that the investor will always be willing to enter into an agreement,
i.e., 1
W&
1
W,
 *
,
*
,
≥ . 
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END NOTES
                                                
1
 Credibility is important in economic theory related to many policy issues other than taxation.
For fiscal and monetary policy issues, see, e.g., the book edited by Persson and Tabellini [13].
2
 In the modeling of the outcome of the negotiations we have chosen the axiomatic approach of
Nash [8].  The parameter α  represents the negotiating power of the country.  An alternative
approach would be to use the Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining model, see Rubinstein [12] and Ståhl
[14].  In order to include the Rubinstein-Ståhl model, which is a multi-period model, into our
model, we would need to assume that each round of negotiations over a specific royalty would
take place at the same point in time.
